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Motivation 
Software-defined networking (SDN) is a physical separation of the network 
control plane from the forwarding plan, where a control plane controls several 
devices. SDN is a new architecture that is manageable, cost- effective, 
adaptable, dynamic, and suitable for a high bandwidth to enable today’s 
applications to perform well. 
The SDN Security has been a major attention for its deployment. SDN threats 
are more sophisticated to defend since control messages issued by a compro-
mised controller look legitimate [1]. The researchers are doing a good effort to 
deals with the injection packets or Daniel of Serves attack from illegal users. the 
switch sends any new event or request to the controller which is responsible for 
computing a suitable path and supplies the switches with new rules. The 
attackers exploit this procedure to inject the network by packets which come to 
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increase the overhead or trying to hack the network. The authors add methods 
to the controller to check every single packet. However, the methods do not 
prevent the forged packet from entering the controller, thus more overhead and 
it is possible to disrupt the controller [3] [2]. 
In general, our research aims to uncover a new security vulnerability in the 
OpenFlow communication process, topology management service and Rest 
API in the SDN controller. It presents a novel attack against the SDN controller 
and demonstrates the feasibility of such attack. Moreover, the PhD work 
discuses several possible solutions to mitigate security vulnerabilities. 
Approach 
The dependence on the target controller to deal with bad packets is sufficient 
to give these packets a good chance to get in the controller, thus increasing the 
overhead or even inserting malicious instructions to steal or disrupt the target 
information. Our proposal, the INSPECTOR is a hardware device added to the 
SDN architecture to protect a compromised controller from a packet injection 
attack by verifying the authentication of Packet-In Messages accessing network 
resources [1].  Figure 1 shows such topology which uses the inspector. 
 
Figure 1: Inspector Location between the switches and the controller  
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Simulation 
To investigate the feasibility and the effect of our work, we compared 
INSPECTOR to the PacketChecker module [2] which was assumed to deal 
with a flow of packets with the same share of forged addresses (e.g. 1000 
packets). With simulations, we show that this INSPECTOR device efficiently 
stops the attack and enhances the controller performance under malicious 
attack.  In our experiment, every single packet has a different address. To do 
that, the implementation is tested using the Mininet emulator where the Ryu 
controller 1.3 is used to manage a Fat Tree topology with a server [1].  
Conclusion and Future Work  
In our simulations, we prove that using an additional hardware device to deal 
with the forged packet is an efficient approach and significantly enhances the 
controller performance during the attack. As a future work, the next step is to 
add a trusted third party ensuring the INSPECTOR would not be com-
promised. Furthermore, the search method could be reduced to a constant time 
by using a smarter data structure. 
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